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Military Revolution in Sixteenth-century Europe (International Library of Historical Studies) Eltis Amazon UK ref: 1850439605 | Amazon US ref: This polemical academic work argues for the importance of the sixteenth century as a period of major military transition, as opposed to those who have placed exclusive emphasis on Seventeenth Century innovators like Gustavus Adolphus (1594-1632) and Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625).
The starting point is a criticism of the views first expounded by Professor Michael Roberts in 1956 and, secondly of those advanced by Professor Geoffrey Parker who qualified but essentially accepted Roberts' ideas. Eltis' arguments appear compelling. Roberts suggested, inter alia, that the replacement of longbows by firearms represented some sort of regression in effectiveness compensated for by an alleged reduction in training requirements. The concept that the longbow was more effective than the musket is a myth that has passed strongly into amateur consciousness. Firearms, of course, proved their superiority because of their ability to penetrate plate armour, protection that neutralised the lance as well as the arrow.
Eltis traces the universal supremacy in sixteenth-century continental European warfare of the pike-firearm combination over pikes alone. The complexity of drilling formations of literally thousands of pikemen, later with supporting shot, necessitated a revolution in mass training, command and control which superseded the individual training of mediaeval warfare. The new warfare demanded new ranks, most notably the sergeant-major, who required mathematical skills. His calculations could be assisted by published tables, sometimes with diagrams and explanatory notes, though for field use they would obviously be memorised and judgements made by eye. Order was imperative, discipline decisive, and training fundamental. Some of the foundations of military competence could now be laid by book learning, and military command now benefited from literacy, numeracy and historical education.
Another revolutionary facet of Fifteenth Century warfare was the development of iron projectiles and cannon cast in one piece which rendered mediaeval castle and town defences obsolete. The answer to improved artillery was thick, squat angle-bastioned forts which could be stone, expensive and long-lasting or earth, cheap and more temporary. Eltis quotes some interesting figures for reduction by artillery bombardment. A good siege-train could destroy 120 feet of traditional wall in 24 hours, but 7000-15000 cannonballs would be needed to breach a modern rampart. In practice it was desirable to take out not only the curtain wall but the flanking bastions, as well as to maintain fire on an open breach to deter repair. Provided there was space to dig, the defenders could counter a breach with a half-moon retrenchment bristling with concentrated firepower. Successful assaults were thus rare in Sixteenth Century warfare.
A chapter on England outlines its comparative backwardness in adopting the pike and shot combination in preference to its traditional bills and bows. There were few regular troops, and the ranks of expeditionary forces were typically filled with 'rogues and vagabonds'. Commanders were sometimes experienced but often amateurish, and there was a lack of modern military manuals in English. Even where new fortifications were built in the Sixteenth Century (such as Henry VIII's coastal defences), they lacked angle-bastions. Matters improved following the militia reforms in the last quarter of the Sixteenth Century and under pressure of the war with Spain (1585-1604).
The book concludes with a useful bibliographical essay reviewing secondary resources.
© armed-combat.com 1/2003
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