Warfare's Slow Evolution

the weapons, formations and tactics of land warfare

introduction

For the greater part of history the technology of warfare was dominated by the spear. Whether one- or two-handed, thrust or thrown, or used on foot or horseback, the metal-tipped wooden shaft has been man's most characteristic weapon.The Macedonian phalangite and the Cromwellian pikeman were divided by 2000 years, but carried essentially the same hardware. The Norman army of 1066 and the British Army of 1914 both included mounted lancers.

The spear keeps your opponent at a distance, outreaches shorter weapons and - using relatively little metal - is cheap and easy to manufacture. Irish patriots in Wolf Tone's Rebellion in 1798 were armed with half-pikes, weapons that could easily be manufactured by local blacksmiths.

Formations also took a long time to evolve. The supremacy of firearms rendered them shallower, but the concept of a battle line in which most men fought shoulder to shoulder was equally familiar to Roman legionary or Napoleonic musketman. For some two thousand years, battles took the form of a head-to-head clash until one side weakened, panicked and ran. Far from saving themselves, it was at this point that the losing side would suffer its greatest casualties. Only with the growth of rapid-fire weapons in the second half of the Nineteenth Century and  high-explosives in the Twentieth did the empty battlefield become the norm.

ancient
to 410 AD

During the 8th Century the heroic nature of early Greek warfare gave way to the organised and disciplined hoplite. Named after his large shield, the  hoplite was armed with a  with thrusting spear, bronze helmet, corselet and greaves and fought in close-packed ranks. The hoplite was the undisputed master of Greek warfare and the Spartans its best exponents until both both hoplites and Spartans received a dramatic reverse on Sphacteria (425 BC).

The hoplite was superseded by the Macedonian/Hellenistic pike phalanx. The pike, a long two-handed spear optimised for defence against cavalry, was obviously not thrown and difficult to thrust with any accuracy. It therefore must have depended on continuous forward movement, or use in defence (against cavalry) when a hedge of spearpoints would be presented. Cavalry was also an important arm for the Macedonians, and Hellenistic Successor armies added elephants.

Extremely vulnerable when disordered, the pike phalanx was beaten by the characteristic Roman system of a heavy throwing-spear (pilum) and immediate advance to contact with sword and shield, a combination which took advantage of adding missile fire whilst overcoming the potential psychological confusion of arming soldiers with both distant-effect and hand-to-hand weapons.

With engineering and siege warfare skills, the Romans were undisputed masters in the West, but in the Carrhae Campaign against the Parthians (54-53 BC) they encountered a combination of light horse-archers and heavily-armed lancers and suffered extremely heavily.

The horse-archer culture which had spread from the Steppes was paralleled in the West by the rise of the Germanic barbarians (200-400 AD) who made significantly greater use of the horse than had their ancestors.

After defeat by the Goths at Adrianople (378), infantry took second place to cavalry in the Roman Army, particularly in the Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire where lance-and-bow-armed cavalry became the core troop type.

mediaeval
411-1494

The stirrup reached Persia by the 7th or early 8th Century from where it spread to the Arabs, Byzantium and France. It was at one time widely assumed that the stirrup was decisive in the growth in importance of shock cavalry (the knight) and even the Feudal system, but this view is now disputed.

The supremacy of cavalry in early mediaeval times requires comment. Cavalry (and, in remote antiquity, chariots) provided mobility and thus the ability to move around flanks and rear.  Mounted troops could strike fear into poor quality infantry, but horses are not tanks and their 'shock' ability should not be over-estimated. They have inevitably been checked when confronted with well-organised and disciplined infantry.

As the Middle Ages drew on there was a revival in the relative importance of infantry and combined arms, and knightly supremacy was challenged by non-noble infantry armies recruited from peasants or burghers. At Legnano (1176) spear-armed infantry and cavalry of the Lombard League defeated the all-cavalry force of Frederick Barbarossa. At Courtrai (1302) Flemish pikemen massacred French heavy cavalry in the admittedly rather special conditions of marshy terrain crossed by canals. At Morgarten (1315)  an Austrian army of cavalry and infantry was chopped to pieces by a numerically inferior force of Swiss halberdiers.

But perhaps the most revolutionary and devastating development was the Welsh/English longbow. Employed decisively against the Scots and French, the longbow was a formidable weapon in the hands of the rising class of English yeomen. 'Longish bows' had been around for some time, but incredible draw-weight and the physique to support it made the mediaeval English longbow a highly effective weapon when used in massed formations defended by sharpened steaks and backed up with hand-to-hand weapons. The longbow assured English supremacy over the French from Crécy (1346) to Agincourt (1415).

Knightly response took the form of heavier (plate) armour and attacking on foot (the French at Agincourt). In response to  plate, giant 'can-openers'  in the form of two-handed polearms (combining the features of spear and axe) became favoured by infantry and by knights themselves.

Plate armour was, however, no answer to the growing effectiveness of firearms which, unlike the longbow, did not require a lifetime of dedication. Early use of handguns (and armoured wagons) was pioneered by Czech Protestants in the Hussite Wars (1419-1436)

renaissance
1495-1600

Sixteenth Century battlefields were dominated by large pike blocks (Swiss, Landsknecht, and Spanish) supported by an increasing proportion of shot (handgunners, arquebusiers, and musketeers). At the Battle of Pavia (1525) French men-at-arms were shot down by Spanish arquebusiers sheltering in copses or behind hedges. Sixteenth-Century Spanish armies were particularly advanced in having a high proportion of shot.

Prince Maurice of Nassau became Commander in Chief of the Dutch armies in 1590 and his drastic reforms were to lay the pattern of warfare for years to come. Infantry were organised into smaller tactical units (battalions of 500-1000) and cavalry lancers were converted to pistol-armed cuirassiers.

pike & shot
1601-1700

During the Seventeenth Century the proportion of shot gradually overtook that of pikes. By the English Civil Wars (1642-1651), a ratio of 2:1 was favoured, though many Royalist regiments could only manage a ratio of 1:1. Battles of the English Civil War took a very predictable course. Infantry would be drawn up in the centre with cavalry on the wings. Whichever side won the more quickly decisive cavalry battles and kept their cavalry under control, would then be in a position to attack the enemy infantry from flank and rear.

With the adoption of the bayonet by the end of the century, pikes finally became redundant. For the greater part of the Seventeenth Century most muskets were matchlocks. Flintlocks were used first by artillery train guards and dragoons (mounted infantry).

horse & musket
1701-1815

Infantry tactics in the Eighteenth Century were dominated by thin lines (2-3 ranks) closely packed together to maximise the frontal firepower of flintlock muskets. The close order and heavy discipline also helped to stop troops running away or deserting.

The French Revolutionary armies made widespread use of skirmishers and columns which both suited untrained hordes. These innovations matured into the ordre mixte - a versatile combination of battalion columns and lines with a strong screen of skirmishers. Although vulnerable to fire, columns were better at manoeuvre and formation change.

By the time of Napoleon, weapons, tactics and doctrine surrounding the flintlock musket had reached their apotheosis. A complex triangle of mixed arms had to be managed. Only infantry could hold ground, but it could be forced into square by cavalry. Cavalry was unlikely to overwhelm a square of infantry presenting bayonets and spitting out shot, but the close-packed infantry ranks then became extremely vulnerable to artillery. Although a master of strategy, Napoleon was responsible for little in the way of tactical innovation except for the use of massed artillery in 'Grand Batteries'.

Despite Oman's views about the superiority and importance of British firepower, a particular (and highly effective) feature of British infantry tactics during the Napoleonic Wars was willingness to come to close quarters. It has been suggested that this 'Roman style' shoot-and-charge tactic had been inherited from the Scottish Highlanders who were recruited into the British Army in large numbers in the wake of the failure of the '45 Rebellion.

19thC
1816-1900

Another major feature of the late Nineteenth Century warfare were railways. Although first used by the French in the Franco-Austrian war of 1859, it was the Prussians who had the vital advantage in concentrating troops during the Franco-Prussian War. (Railways were later to impose an irresistible timetable to the process of mobilisation which preceded and even propelled the start of the First World War.)

20thC
1901-2000

Besides high-explosive, the First World War was also characterised by the supremacy of the machinegun (grossly underestimated at the beginning), the deadlock of trench warfare and weapons which it demanded such as the hand- and rifle-grenade, the mortar and gas. Contrary to propaganda films depicting almost Napoleonic tactics, attacks were generally made with relatively small groups of skirmishers.

The war became more fluid in its later stages and this was accompanied by new developments in military ideology (infiltration, defence in depth) which, given reliable armoured vehicles and mobile radio transmitters, were to give rise to the theory and practice of blitzkrieg.

Tanks had been mechanically too unreliable to have assumed importance in the First World War, but came into their own in the Second. Tanks were difficult to knock out  except by the German 88 mm dual-purpose AA/AT gun, but became vulnerable with the development of hollow-charge weapons.

Similarities between the First and Second World Wars (at least in the later stages of each) were greater than is often realised. They both became wars of attrition with similar levels of casualties amongst frontline troops.

The Second World War also saw the rise of airpower, but its effect on naval warfare was far more profound than that on land warfare.

In the post-War world transport and gunship helicopters, anti-tank guided weapons, image-intensifying night sights and laser rangefinders have added new dimensions and levels of sophistication, but many wars all over the world continue to be fought with essentially Second World War technology.