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Geopolitica: Zbigniew Brzezinski and U.S. Geostrategy
The Grand Chessboard
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Zbigniew Brzezinski's The Grand Chessboard
is nothing less than a blueprint for U.S. global domination drawn
up by an insider of the American foreign policy establishment. Responding
to Brzezinski's gaming metaphor, armed-combat.com examines the rules,
brings them up-to-date and speculates on the final outcome of the
great game. |
| Of Polish Catholic origin, Zbigniew Brzezinski grew
up with a hostility to Russia which seems to have outlived the Cold
War. National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski
has also been associated with the secretive Bilderberg Group and
founded its spin-off, the Trilateral Commission. An insider of the
U.S.-based global elite, Brzezinski has been a key player in the
influential world of foundations, institutes and think-tanks which
comprise the bureaucracy of international policy making. |
| The Grand Chessboard is a work of 'Geopolitics'
- the study of states in relation to geography. Although it may seem
rather nineteenth century to those brought up in the quasi-religious
milieu of the Cold War, the world does still consist of (potentially)
conflicting sovereign states and would be readily recognised by Mackinder,
Mahan, Haushofer and Spykman - Brzezinski’s historical geopolitical
predecessors. |
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"It is no exaggeration to say
that the territorial imperative has been the main impulse
driving the aggressive behavior of nation-states...Nation-states
continue to be the basic units of the world system."
Page 37
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Writing from a U.S. perspective, Brzezinski frankly recognises
that Eurasia is 'where it's at'. It's where most of the world's
population and three-quarters of its reserves of natural resources
are found. It's the stage of world history. And it's certainly the
stage, or, in Brzezinski's case, the chessboard where the U.S. plays
the great game of international power politics. |
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"For America, the chief geopolitical
prize is Eurasia." Page 30
"Eurasia accounts for about 60 percent of
the world's GNP and about three-fourths of the world's known
energy resources..." Page 31 |
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| The main aim of U.S. policy is to prevent the emergence
of a single dominant power or an alliance in Eurasia which is antagonistic
to the U.S. and thus threatens the U.S.’s own world hegemony.
But the U.S. does not have overwhelming power to prevent this, and
precisely because of the disparity in size, numbers and resources
between Eurasia and North America, the U.S. attempt to interfere in
and control Eurasia is necessarily asymmetrical, a term that American
military theorists have recently popularised in relation to weak powers
using unconventional means against their own overwhelming military
strength (e.g. ‘terrorism’). |
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"..the issue of how a globally
engaged America copes with the complex Eurasian power relationships
- and particularly whether it prevents the emergence of a
dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power - remains central
to America's capacity to exercise global primacy." Pages
xiii-xiv
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Brzezinski believes that if America does not translate its current
hegemony into 'world order' in this generation, the world will sink
into chaos and anarchy. If this sounds Apocalyptic it's because
it's driven by the desperation born of America's relative long-term
decline.
Superficially, America is a strong player. It is not only the world's
leading military power, but combines this with the influence of
its economic and technological dynamism and its cultural appeal
to the world's youth. But in terms of economic power and the military
clout which goes with it, America is potentially challenged by the
emergence of new powers such as Europe and China. |
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"In brief, America as the world's
premier power does face a narrow window of historical opportunity."
Page 213
"Cultural domination has been an underappreciated
facet of American global power. Whatever one may think of
its aesthetic values, America's mass culture exercises a magnetic
appeal, especially on the world's youth." Page 25
"The scope of America's global hegemony is
admittedly great, but its depth is shallow..." Page 35 |
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The current game begins in 1945 with U.S. occupation of Germany
and Japan which are reduced to American protectorates. These provide
the basic perches for the American presence in Eurasia, at least
until the recent invasion of Iraq, but the security of these perches
has to be maintained. The trick on the left flank of the chessboard
is to promote a united but weak Western Europe under U.S. hegemony.
Germany is the strongest economic power in the region, but it is
also politically embarrassed. France is the only other country that
counts. Britain can be dismissed as inconsequential and largely
irrelevant. Japan is also very strong economically. It is virtually
demilitarised, but shielded by the U.S. presence in South Korea
which helps to avoid bringing this status into question. Strategically
vulnerable, it is regarded with hostility and suspicion by other
Asian countries, and thus cannot be used as the diplomatic cover
for advancing U.S. influence. The main U.S. option here is to ‘play
the China card’. |
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"The Sino-Soviet bloc dominated
most of Eurasia but did not control its peripheries. North
America succeeded in entrenching itself on both the extreme
western and extreme eastern shores of the great Eurasian continent."
Page 6
"...Great Britain is not a geostrategic player...it
entertains no ambitious vision of Europe's future...Its ambivalence
regarding European unification and its attachment to a waning
special relationship with America have made Great Britain
increasingly irrelevant insofar as the major choices confronting
Europe's future are concerned." Page 42 |
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| During the Cold War the U.S. and Soviet players both
enjoy a nuclear option, but if this is used the game ends abruptly.
The players must, therefore, fight by proxy. It is in one of these
peripheral struggles that a third, southern, front is opened in Afghanistan,
providing the U.S. with a prime opportunity for establishing a presence
in the Persian Gulf. |
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"The United States, a non-Eurasian
power, now enjoys international primacy, with its power directly
deployed on three peripheries of the Eurasian continent, from
which it exercises a powerful influence on the states occupying
the Eurasian hinterland." Page 39
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With
the end of the Cold War the U.S. player is left in control of all
the world’s oceans and seas, but its toe-holds on the Eurasian
landmass remain precarious. Post-Soviet Russian could re-emerge
as a powerful force and needs to be isolated by the eastwards extension
of the European Union and NATO. This will not only push back Russian
influence but weaken the coherence of the European Union itself
and the likelihood of its emergence as an independent power rivaling
the U.S.
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"It follows that a wider Europe
and an enlarged NATO will serve well both the short-term and
the longer-term goals of U.S. policy. A larger Europe will
expand the range of American influence - and, through the
admission of new Central European members, also increase in
the European councils the number of states with a pro-American
proclivity - without simultaneously creating a Europe politically
so integrated that it could soon challenge the United States
on geopolitical matters of high importance to America elsewhere,
particularly in the Middle East." Page 199
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In particular, the U.S. player must ensure that the Ukraine remains
detached from Russia, and that American influence penetrates the
post-Soviet central Asian republics. U.S. pressure for the admission
of Turkey to the EU ties together the two halves of the western
and southern front strategies. Turkey and the post-Soviet Turkic
states of Central Asia play a peculiarly important role in Brzezinski’s
view of the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union rolled back
the frontiers of the Russian dominated state to reveal a series
of ethnically Turkish areas which are endowed with rich natural
resources and are strategically important. These states fall within
Brzezinski's delineated "Global Zone of Percolating Violence"
(map, page 53) which stretches from Turkey in the west to Kashmir
in the east, and from Kazakhstan in the north to the Yemen in the
south. |
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"...if Moscow regains control
over the Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources
as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically
again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial
state, spanning Europe and Asia." Page 46
"...America should use its influence in Europe
to encourage Turkey's eventual admission to the EU..."
Page 204 |
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| Within this area there is an inner ring which he describes
as "The Eurasian Balkans" (map, page 124). This is also
an area of ethnic and political instability, but is distinguished
from the outer ring in also being a political vacuum. He regards the
outer ring as already in the bag. The Asiatic Balkans are thus an
area of major 'opportunity', and a particular project is the routing
of oil by pipeline through the Turkic republics to oil refineries
in Turkey, thus bypassing the old north-south routes linking this
area with Russia. |
| Brzezinski's book was published in 1997 and at this
point things are looking good for the U.S. player. The Islamic world
appears to be on side. Turkey is a confirmed U.S. ally, and a range
of autocratic Arab states need U.S. help to suppress mass support
for Islamic Fundamentalism and their own overthrow. As the world's
leading oceanic power, America has in many respects assumed the geopolitical
role previously enjoyed by Britain. And like Britain in the nineteenth
century, the U.S. homeland enjoys virtual immunity from attack. But
that was before 9/11. It may not have changed the objectives of American
foreign policy but it has changed America’s approach. |
| With the benefit of hindsight we can now recognise that
the inevitably asymmetric nature of U.S. geostrategy resulted in a
complex range of opportunistic local initiatives that were ultimately
contradictory. While committed to Israel (its only deep alliance),
the U.S. also supported Islamic Fundamentalism against the Soviet
Union (Afghanistan) and secular Arab nationalism (Ba'athist Iraq)
against another brand of Islamic Fundamentalism (Iran). The moral
encouragement given to Iraq led it to invade Kuwait. The liberation
of Kuwait necessitated U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia. A former U.S. asset
and minor player from the forgotten war in Afghanistan, didn’t
like American infidels based near the Holy Shrines and plotted the
most audacious and spectacular atrocity in the history of world terrorism.
The tragic impacts of the aircraft on 9/11 also symbolised the collision
of the contradictions of U.S. policy. The particular path of causality
would have been hard to predict, but all the pieces of the jigsaw
were clearly of U.S. manufacture. |
| Instead of initiating some soul searching, however,
9/11 became a latter-day Pearl Harbour, unleashing the ambitions of
a previously marginalised but now influential group of pro-Israeli
'Neocon' hawks who view Brzezinski as a wimp and even as an ‘anti-Semite’
because of his support for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The
U.S. adoption of unilateralism (we can so we will) and pre-emptive
defence (you might threaten us at some point in the future, so we'll
zap you first) are essentially based on the Israeli model. |
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"But the pursuit
of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except
in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public's
sense of domestic well-being." Page 36
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| The new rules, written by the U.S. player their self,
replace Brzezinski’s cautious and rational academic nuances
by a distinctly Biblical tone in which enemies are cast not as players
but as “The Evil Ones”. Targets are accused of developing
weapons of mass destruction or having links with terrorism. The accusations
may be combined or alternated, and no publicly cited evidence is required
to prove them. Few other players will be seen to believe these accusations
unless they are openly or covertly bribed and/or threatened. Iraq
is a good target for this treatment, precisely because UN inspectors
fail to find any current evidence of weapons of mass destruction.
Any files suggesting that their previous manufacture may have been
facilitated by the U.S. are waylaid. |
| The British Prime Minister specifically subscribes to
the U.S. vision of a unipolar world under U.S. control, and the U.S.
player can thus add British forces to his command, rebranding his
military adventures as a 'Coalition', and as a crusade to liberate
Iraq from the terror of an undemocratic tyranny. The U.S. player can
then terrorise the population into submission with 'Shock and Awe'
bombing after which the liberated country can be occupied. |
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"With Britain self-marginalised
and essentially an appendage to U.S. power..." Page 63
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| Once in control of Iraq, the U.S. player occupies a
key strategic position. Firstly, Iraq floats on a sea of oil. Secondly
it sits on top of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states which also
float on a sea of oil. U.S.-occupied Iraq also borders Iran, an old
protagonist, another member of the “Axis of Evil” and
another oil-producer. In this position, the U.S. not only assures
continued supply of its own oil but controls the oil supply of others,
such as Europe and Japan. Coupled with its interests in the Turkic
regions, the U.S. has cornered the market. But this isn’t all
about oil. Iraq also borders Syria, and Syria supports the Palestinian
guerrilla groups waging war on Israel out of Syrian-held Lebanon.
The U.S. can now bring pressure to bear on Syria or even invade it. |
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Above all, the U.S. has consolidated its hold on the Persian Gulf
and established a bridgehead in Eurasia which commands the intersection
of Europe, Asia and Africa and is far enough away from Europe, Russia
and China as to escape dependence upon them. But however good the
U.S. position may look, we should not forget Brzezinski's essentially
pessimistic temporal desperation. An empire also requires moral
strength, or, as Brzezinski puts it, "cultural superiority".
In considering the British Empire he notes: "By 1914, only
a few thousand British military personnel and civil servants controlled
about 11 million square miles and almost 400 million non-British
peoples..." (Page 21). Do the Americans have that cultural
superiority over the Eurasian continent whose civilization stretches
back literally thousands of years? Brzezinksi's frequent and telling
references to hedonism suggest otherwise. Talking of the Roman Empire,
Brzezinski notes "the prolonged period of imperial hubris generated
a cultural hedonism that gradually sapped the political elite's
will to greatness" (Page 12). The U.S. Empire will almost certainly
not last as long. |
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"...cultural change in America
may also be uncongenial to the sustained exercise abroad of
genuinely imperial power. That exercise requires a high degree
of doctrinal motivation, intellectual commitment, and patriotic
gratification. Yet the dominant culture of the country has
become increasingly fixated on mass entertainment that has
been heavily dominated by personally hedonistic and socially
escapist themes." Page 212
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